Several EU-wide reports have identified obstacles for the effective application of the Race Equality Directive ('RED') and the Framework Equality Directive ('FED') at national level, but they do not explain why these obstacles arise. This paper seeks to provide additional tools to understand what may be the causes for the limited application of those directives at national level. On the basis of the theory of the 'social working of law', developed by Griffiths, I present an analytical framework to explain why people follow anti-discrimination law -or not-and which choices they make when they suffer discrimination. I argue that the RED and the FED are mainly based on individual enforcement. Therefore, the proposed framework analyses the decision-making procedure of individual victims of discrimination, from the moment they suffer discrimination till they decide to bring a claim. It identifies the main factors playing a role in victims' decisions, the barriers they may encounter in accessing the legal system and the role played by advice-providers, like equality bodies or NGOs. The paper also considers the limitations of such a framework for tackling the problem of institutional discrimination.
Introduction
Several reports show that discrimination continues to be very widespread in the European Union ('EU'). In a survey of the Fundamental Rights Agency ('FRA') focusing on the Roma, 47% of respondents had suffered racial discrimination in the previous year 2 . In a survey concerning Muslims, 43% of respondents felt discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity or migrant origin and their religion 3 . In another report on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender population, half of the respondents had felt discriminated against in the previous year, on average. 4 Further research reveals that discrimination is not only sensed by victims, but also by their social environment. According to a 2012 special Eurobarometer, 34% of citizens living the EU had witnessed discrimination or harassment or had heard of it happening to someone in the previous year. 5 56% of tims' resignation to suffer discrimination as part of their daily lives (40%), 19 the fear to suffer retaliation (26%) and time costs (21%). 20 These reports indicate that there are obstacles for the use of national laws implementing the Race Equality Directive ('RED') 21 and the Framework Equality Directive ('FED') 22 but they do not explain why these obstacles arise. This paper seeks to provide an analytical framework ascertaining what may be the causes for the limited application at national level of the RED and the FED. Whilst it is certainly very difficult to completely eradicate discrimination, analysing the practical use of the antidiscrimination directives is a necessary first step to draw paths for improvement.
In this article I suggest that the use of the RED and the FED at national level can largely be explained from a bottom-up perspective 23 based on individual enforcement (section 2). After recognising the limits of this model (section 3), I analyse the main factors playing a role in the use of the RED and the FED (section 4), before drawing some concluding remarks (section 5). The paper takes an analytical, rather than a normative approach, aiming to provide a basis for potential socio-legal research which could draw normative conclusions. specific case of anti-discrimination law, the legislator presumes that after enacting equality legislation employers will not discriminate minorities in access to employment, so they will employ more ethnic minorities workers (direct effect), and as result, companies will have a more diverse workforce (indirect effect).
However, this top-down approach relies on several assumptions which are not necessarily true. Firstly, the legislator presumes that individuals will change their behaviour once the law is enacted. But to do so individuals need to be aware of the law and understand it, 26 and they need to be able to tell when it applies. 27 As Griffiths points, there are 'two critical prerequisites for rule-following: knowledge and interpretation of the applicable facts and knowledge and interpretation of the applicable rules ' . 28 Not least important, individuals need also to be willing to abide by the law. 29 Secondly, the fact that individuals follow the law does not directly entail that the pursued objectives will be met. If we take the same example, even if employers follow the RED and do not discriminate ethnic minorities in access to employment, it can be that only few members of ethnic minorities apply for jobs in a specific sector because they assume that they will be discriminated anyway or because they consider that their qualifications do not match the position requirements. Hence, the workforce will not become more diverse and the indirect goal will not be met.
This shows that societies are complex and often intertwined with many different factors which have an impact on the use and effects of rules. Probably, not every individual will act following the rational pattern of the 'carrot' and the 'stick' 30 because they may be influenced by their moral beliefs, 31 social environment, economic resources, or customs. 32 Besides the contents of the law, the social reception of the law is indeed a crucial factor for its mobilization. 33 To take account of the factors which may influence rule-following, I build on Griffiths' work in the field of legal anthropology, particularly on his 'social working of law' 34 theory. Griffiths adopts a bottom-up perspective for the analysis of rule-following on the basis of the concept of the 'shop floor of social life'. 35 The shop-floor is composed by a set of communities with their own internal organisa-26 See eg T Havinga, 'The effects and limits of anti-discrimination law in The Netherlands ' (2002) The analysis of rule-following from a bottom-up perspective led Griffiths to distinguish between three different types of uses of rules, 40 which will be the starting point of our analysis. Right at the bottom he identified informal uses of rules, which take place when individuals apply rules spontaneously in their everyday relationships. They apply rules because they match their social and moral values or because they have 'internalised' them, even if they do not match their 'inner convictions'. 41 Once they know about the existence of a rule, it will affect social actors' behaviour, who will also build expectations about their counterparts' actions. 42 If a conflict arises, individuals may use a rule to solve it internally through negotiation, according to their respective bargaining powers. 43 A second category are organisational uses, which take place within private and public organisations, that is, SASFs which take the form of a legal person. All companies need to incorporate legal developments to their internal policies, for instance, by adjusting their recruitment procedures to antidiscrimination law. 44 However, it is usually easier to do it for large or publicly-owned companies than for SMEs because they tend to have human resources and/or compliance departments, which follow legal developments and implement them internally. 45 Organisational uses of rules can either refer to the implementation of rules within an organisation or to the resolution of disputes internally within the SASF, by bringing the matter before the relevant authority within that organisation.
Finally, the last category consists of uses of rules before administrative or judicial authorities, through complaints and litigation. This is usually the only use which is considered in statistics and official reports. It refers both to ex officio enforcement (ie claims which are brought at the initiative of 36 Moore (n 32) 720. Among these three types of uses of rules, informal uses are the ones which are quantitatively more important because they can take place at any moment, sometimes even in an unconscious way. Organisational uses are also quantitatively relevant but not as much as informal uses, as they require implementation procedures which may involve the participation of different persons and departments and may raise organisational costs. Finally, complaints and litigation have a relatively low relevance because they imply high costs in terms of time, money and social relations, which often detract individuals from starting legal actions. 47 Even if the social working of law brings attention to informal and organisational uses of rules, formal uses of rules should not be disregarded. Complaints and litigation are necessary ex post mechanisms to ensure that when the application of anti-discrimination law at informal and organisational levels fails, victims have legal devices to seek reparation and perpetrators can be sanctioned.
3. Building a rule-following model for the analysis of EU antidiscrimination law
EU anti-discrimination law as an individual enforcement model
The RED and the FED contain features which can help promote informal and organisational uses of anti-discrimination law, like the provision allowing positive action 48 or the obligation to disseminate information, 49 but both directives lean more clearly towards formal enforcement. The RED and the FED also comprise some group justice features, like the obligation to create a body 'for the promotion of equal treatment', 50 the duty to promote social dialogue 51 or the possibility for legal entities to support individual claims, 52 but the provisions on types of complaint procedures, 53 legal standing, 54 protection against victimisation, 55 etc show that both directives rely principally on individual enforcement. 56
46 In some countries, collective claims and active legal standing for legal entities may also be allowed. This approach was confirmed by the Firma Feryn 57 judgment, which concerned an employer's public statement that he did not want to hire immigrants, without any specific person being identified as a victim of such policy. 58 Following a teleological interpretation, the ECJ established that 'victimless discrimination' 59 is included in the concept of direct discrimination of article 2(2)(a) of the RED. 60 It nevertheless considered that MS are not obliged to provide redress mechanisms if there is no identifiable victim. Under article 7(2) of the RED, MS are only bound to allow legal entities with a legitimate interest to act 'on behalf or in support' of the victim, with her consent. Following AG Maduro 61 , the ECJ distinguished between the substantive contents of the RED and the enforcement provisions and pointed that the fact that 'victimless discrimination' was prohibited under the RED did not imply that the directive obliged to provide enforcement mechanisms to address it. 62 The ECJ reminded that the RED sets only minimum requirements, meaning that MS can allow legal entities, like associations or equality bodies, to bring actio popularis without the existence of any identifiable victim, but they are not obliged to do it. 63 This reasoning poses problems because it entails the recognition of substantive rights for which enforcement mechanisms cannot be derived from EU law, 64 but it confirms that the RED's approach is mainly based on individual litigation. The ECJ seems not willing to push for an interpretation of article 7 which could easily be considered contrary to the EU legislator's will, 65 and a similar conclusion can be drawn for the FED from the ruling in Asociaţia.
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Against this background, whilst acknowledging that discrimination has a collective dimension, 67 this paper focuses mainly on the decision-making processes and uses of rules by the individual who suffers discrimination. 
The bottom-up analytical model: from informal to formal effectiveness
The starting point of the proposed theoretical approach will be an individual example. Consider the situation of two shopkeepers of a retail store, A and B. A is a Roma and was selected for the job among other equally qualified candidates thanks to a corporate programme to promote the integration of underrepresented ethnic minorities. Initially, A and B have a good relationship, but after some time a conflict arises because B starts harassing A.
At the outset, anti-discrimination law was voluntarily followed by the retail store director, who hired A (organisational use), and it was also followed by A's colleagues, who -unconsciously or not-treated him just as another employee (informal use). These types of uses of rules are what I have labelled as 'informal effectiveness'. 68 This concept refers to situations where individuals, consciously or unconsciously, abide the law in their private relationships, or when organisations take the necessary steps to enforce the law internally, without having recourse to third parties external to their SASF.
After A is harassed by B, A has several 'choices'. A first possibility would be trying to deal with the problem internally 'negotiating' with B, for instance by reminding B that harassment is unlawful and threatening B by reporting his conduct to the director. Depending on the relative bargaining power of A and B, A will be able to persuade B to cease his conduct and they will reach an 'amicable adjustment'. However, if the conflict remains, A may choose either to avoid the problem or just cope with it or seek the intervention of a third party within their SASF. In that case, A could report the problem to the director of the retail store. It is at this point that a 'dispute' arises. The director may either avoid the problem, or deal directly with it by applying the company's internal code of conduct. Alternatively, he can bring the matter to the human resources department, which may then apply the internal code of conduct to sanction B.
This example illustrates that victims of discrimination can choose between taking action or what Felstiner calls 'lumping', that is, the choice to avoid and/or ignore the legal problem. 69 As Griffiths explains, victims often 'prefer the options of "lumping it" (living with the injury, whatever it is), "avoidance" (reducing the chance of future contact with the offending person) or "exit" from an existing relationship'. 70 I will refer all these avoidance strategies as 'social lumping'.
At an empirical level, several studies indicate the existence of social lumping in the field of discrimination. The most comprehensive survey conducted EU-wide points that 'not reporting discrimination is the norm'. 71 Studies focusing in individual MS also flag the tendency to follow lumping strategies. In a study conducted in the UK, 35% of respondents confronted with discrimination would follow a lumping strategy. 72 In a similar study conducted in the Netherlands, 51.3% of victims of discrimination (or related behaviours) did not take action against it or decided to 'put up with it'. 73 A Spanish 2010 survey reveals that 94.3% of respondents who experienced discrimination did not report it. 74 In Belgium, a report on discrimination among pregnant women at the workplace also identified lumping strategies. 75 Victims who decide not to take action may be influenced by their inner beliefs 76 , but also by external social factors arising within or outside the SASF, such as fear to victimisation, lack of confidence in the legal system, language barriers, etc. 77 Victims may also be influenced by the feeling that it is not socially expected that they take action against discrimination. 78 If instead of lumping the victim tries to solve the problem internally with the aggressor or brings the matter before a SASF authority, we can still consider that we are within the remit of informal effectiveness. However, if the internal claim within the company is not successful, the victim may choose again between social lumping or seeking the intervention of an external third party. Depending on the information available to the victim, she may choose to go for advice to a 'filter', that is, legal professionals, NGOs, trade unions, equality bodies or other actors providing advice. 79 The role of filters will be crucial because their advice may influence the victim's decision to report discrimination (or not) and the type of action she takes. She may choose non-judicial procedures, like alternative dispute resolution or administrative complaints, or judicial procedures. If the victim starts an administrative complaint before an equality body, she may decide not to take further legal actions, or if she is unsatisfied, she may decide to go on to the next stage and bring a claim before the employment tribunals.
This second stage illustrates what I call 'formal effectiveness', 80 which comes into play when the victim takes action through a structured legal procedure, be it going before a court or before an administrative authority. However, it also refers to the victim's decision to seek advice from a third party (external to the SASF where discrimination occurred) to gather information about what to do next. If the victim goes to a filter first, the contents and timing of the advice will be determinant for the victim's decision to start a formal legal procedure or not. 81 The role and influence of filters is selfevident if we consider that in a recent FRA survey one third of the respondents sought advice from 76 Some victims believe that they do not need help, they do not want it; others perceive the incident as too trivial to be reported. See eg Equinet, Tackling the "Known Unknown" (n 7) 9-11. 77 For more details see FRA, EU-Midis. Main Results Report (n 71) 54-56. legal experts before taking formal action and among them, 'two thirds had received legal advice by the time they lodged their complaints'. 82 Even if victims eventually decide to take formal legal action, they may encounter institutional and systemic barriers to effectively pursue their actions. In fact, lumping can be a product of the legal system itself due to two main reasons. Firstly, by deciding if a case is legally relevant or not, filters play a 'screening' role. 83 The most obvious example is lawyers' discretion in deciding whether they take a case or not, 84 but there are other examples. For instance, the procedure followed by Swedish Ombudsmen to decide which cases are admissible 85 and the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) policy to pick up the cases in which it exercises its litigation powers according to its strategic priorities. 86 Accordingly, Ombudsmen, equality bodies and other legal actors often act as 'doorkeepers' of the legal system when they select the cases which may enter the legal system.
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Secondly, some forms of discrimination are more subtle or complex and may not fit into the tests developed by administrative and judicial authorities to apply the law to the facts of a case. Sperino points that the 'multipart tests' (or 'frameworks') used for evaluating the facts of a discrimination claim 'are overly influenced by *…+ the specific cases through which they were developed and are resistant to change'. 88 If we bear in mind that forms of discrimination have evolved over time from overt actions, like direct discrimination, to more subtle actions, 89 like harassment, 'the inflexibility of the framework model makes it unable to account for the full manifestations of discrimination'. 90 For this reason, claimants may struggle to subsume the facts of their cases into a recognised structure, which may lead 'courts to dismiss claims that straddle more than one framework or that do not fit neatly within recognized structures'. 91 Consequently, these formal structures may impede victims' access to formal procedures if they are not successful in reframing their cases following the patterns and the language of discrimination tests. 92 I will refer to this phenomenon and to the 'screening role' of filters as 'institutional lumping' because, in contrast with social lumping, it does not arise from the social environment, but from the institutional framework itself. 91 ibid 71; cf with Banakar's concept of 're-labelling', Banakar, (n 43) 85-86, 100. Both Sperino and Banakar seem to suggest that these processes are 'doorkeeping techniques' which end up framing how formal action against discrimination works and condition which cases enter the legal system. 92 ibid.
A key difference between formal and informal effectiveness is that formal effectiveness is always ex post because the formal machinery only starts working if there has been a discrimination incident, and in most cases, only if the victim is brave enough 'to push the start button' to initiate some type of legal procedure. On the contrary, informal effectiveness can either be ex ante, when the law is respected and there is no discrimination, or ex post, when the law has not been respected but the conflict is solved before it is externalised.
Shortcomings of the bottom-up model based on individual enforcement
Institutional discrimination
As stated earlier, this theoretical model is mainly based on the use of anti-discrimination rules at an individual level. The model describes the decision-making processes and the legal structures that a victim of discrimination is confronted with when facing a particular incident. However, discrimination can be a diffuse phenomenon affecting a whole group, which may be difficult to associate with a specific action and a concrete person. It is thus not always possible to pinpoint a specific incident.
This type of discrimination has been called institutional discrimination, 93 discrimination by omission 94 or third-generation discrimination. 95 It has been described as 'an attitude on the part of the State which consists in not taking the necessary measures to prevent situations of discrimination', 96 especially as regards certain areas of life, like education, housing or access to healthcare. It can be the result from 'a lack or shortage of adequate resources', or from 'ill will' and 'selective attitudes' 97 based on stereotypes and prejudices, which in the long run can lead to social exclusion, victimisation and group disadvantages. 98 In Europe, and more precisely in the UK, institutional discrimination came to the public attention with the murder of Stephen Lawrence in London in 1993. Lawrence's family campaigned to show that the police did not properly investigate the murder due to the victim's ethnic background. This case showed the underlying tensions between police forces and black people in the UK of the 1980s and 1990s 99 on this specific murder but also on a more general appraisal of relations between police forces and ethnic minorities, concluded that the police investigation was faulty due to 'professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers'. 100 Thanks to the Lawrence case both public authorities and the public opinion became aware of the problem of institutional discrimination in the UK. 101 More recently, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) accepted as evidence of discrimination the fact that a disproportionate number of Roma pupils were placed in special primary schools the Czech Republic. 102 Whilst these schools were meant to be -in theory-for any children with special needs, Roma children were more likely to end up in special schools -in practice. 103 The so called 'Ostrava case' was mainly based on statistical evidence collected by the European Roma Rights Centre ('ERRC') 104 but it could only be brought before the ECtHR thanks to the joint application of 18 individuals. 105 Thus, if it had not been for those individuals' readiness to bring an application together and for the statistics collected by the ERRC, the underlying situation of institutional discrimination would probably not have reached the tribunals. The Ostrava case can thus be considered a successful example of individuals being able to bring issues of institutional discrimination before the judicature, but it was in fact part of a wider collective strategy supported by NGOs, like the ERRC. 106 The ECtHR actually acknowledged this collective element by stating that national legislation 'had a disproportionately prejudicial effect on the Roma community' and not considering it necessary to examine the applicants' individual cases. 107
Institutional discrimination is a 'collective failure' which can be perceived 'in processes, attitudes and behaviour*s+', 108 and may -or may not-emerge as a specific discriminatory incident. Due to this collective aspect, individual justice models tend to offer limited possibilities to address it effectively. Makkonen, for instance, criticizes individual enforcement because it 'hides from sight structural and institutional problems that cannot be seen by looking at individual events alone.
[T]he episodic view, just like the law, is only concerned with specific events *…+ and is unconcerned with the more general mechanisms, patterns, causes and consequences that underlie or contribute to the specific events'. 109 However, whilst acknowledging that individual complaints cannot successfully combat institutional discrimination on their own, they can play a role as part of a broader strategy, together with other measures. 110 Individual complaints are not completely useless in tackling institutional discrimination and can trigger other type of more effective policies. As the above mentioned examples suggest, if discrimination materialises in a concrete case, individual complaints can raise awareness and can push states to take measures to address the problem, beyond the individual case. 111 This can be true, even if the final ruling is unfavourable to the victim, especially if civil society organisations are strong and well organised. 112 Civil society can try to 'activate the courts' 113 and feed discussion and public debate about the public authorities' failure to address group disadvantages ('shaming') 114 and they may be able to push for policy and legal change ('reframing'). 115 The Ostrava case can be seen as an example of activating the ECtHR, which has led the Czech Government to take steps to tackle Roma segregation in education. 116 The proposed model only partially addresses institutional discrimination. Policies which target this type of discrimination can lead to informal and organisational uses of anti-discrimination law, and strategic litigation can fall within the remit of formal uses. However, if institutional discrimination does not materialise in specific cases, it would fall outside of the scope of the model. 
Filters may play an active rather than a passive role
Another limitation of the theoretical model lies in the fact that it is not always victims who take the initiative of contacting filters; filters can also play an active role. 117 In some cases NGOs may contact discrimination victims after learning about their case through the media. Filters may also identify a specific situation where discrimination is patent and set up a strategy to produce evidence which would allow bringing the matter to courts. They may try to gather statistical evidence 118 or set up testing strategies. For instance, following a testing strategy an NGO managed to demonstrate discrimination suffered by migrants in access to housing in the city of Bilbao (Spain). 119 Filters can also play an active role in helping victims to recognise situations of discrimination or persuading them to bring a claim.
The presented framework assumes that it is the victim who will contact filters, so formal uses of rules triggered by filters' active search for complainants fall outside the scope of the model. However, when filters take the initiative to organise awareness raising campaigns, they can fall within the remit of informal uses of rules.
Factors playing a role in the use of EU anti-discrimination law
The analytical model presented explains how individuals use anti-discrimination law, either by respecting it at an informal level, or by having recourse to enforcement mechanisms when the law is breached. The model highlights not only how the rules are used, but also what are the obstacles to the use of anti-discrimination law. This section adds some flesh to the bones of the model by briefly analysing the factors which may play a role in the use of EU anti-discrimination law. 120 Firstly, the use of anti-discrimination law depends on individuals' awareness of rules. 121 Citizens need to know about the existence of norms, their contents and how they can be relevant to their particular situation to adjust their 'legal behaviour'. 122 Legal knowledge depends largely on the particular circumstances of each individual, ie its profession, age, social sphere, civil status, etc. 123 Mass media can play a role in informing individuals about the contents of legislation, but research shows that most victims who were are aware of the existence of anti-discrimination law learned about it at school or university (50%) and to a lesser extent, from friends, family, the internet or 'common cul-ture'. 124 Some were also aware about anti-discrimination law because it is linked to their work or they had been active in trade unions and NGOs. 125 Secondly, besides knowing the law, potential users must be able to recognise when they can make use of it. 126 This requires having the relevant information, ie that they were not accepted for a job on the ground of their ethnicity. As the ECJ judgments in Meister 127 and Kelly 128 suggest, this information may not be easily accessible because the alleged perpetrator may not be willing to disclose it. In addition, victims must be able to interpret the factual information as falling within the scope of the relevant rule. Empirical research shows that individuals often have difficulties in labelling a set of facts as being discriminatory, and in some cases it is thanks to family members and friends that they are able to do it. 129 Indeed, the same way that consumers may 'fail to recognize that the product they receive is defective', 130 discrimination victims may fail to realise that they were not accepted as a tenant of a flat for their foreign accent or their skin colour. 131 Thirdly, the use of anti-discrimination law is influenced by the internal values and rules of SASFs. At an informal level, the more anti-discrimination law is in line with SASFs' values and inner believes of individuals, the more it will be spontaneously applied. 132 This does not necessarily imply that antidiscrimination law should have the 'pedagogical' role of shaping people's minds, 133 but rather that the use of rules may be different in each MS, 134 depending on whether 'otherness' is more easily accepted or not. 135 The use of anti-discrimination law will also vary according to SASFs' capacity to integrate norms, or on the contrary, to create resistance to them if they are in conflict with other SASFs' internal norms. 136 For instance, anti-discrimination law can easily clash with public security rules, if we think of Muslim women wearing burkas, 137 or with the freedom of contract, 138 if we Sixthly, the use of rules at an organisational level can also depend on the existence of promotion programmes. Public policies can be launched to grant financial or material advantages to companies who hire a certain percentage of employees from a specific vulnerable community. 150 However, they can also be implemented at the initiative of companies themselves, as part of their internal policies, or to improve their public image.
Finally, time and financial costs 151 and formalistic legal frameworks can also have an influence in formal uses of rules. As discussed earlier, legal frameworks can hinder individuals' access to the legal system, especially as regards subtle and covert forms of discrimination, which may be difficult to subsume in anti-discrimination tests. 152
Conclusion
This paper proposes an analytical model to decode how the RED and the FED are effectively used at national level. Without seeking to explain comprehensively the use of rules as regards a phenomenon as complex as discrimination, it brings the attention to a number of elements which can at least partially explain the application and effects of both directives at national level.
Following the RED and the FED approach to enforcement, which is largely based on individual litigation, the proposed model takes a bottom-up approach by focusing on how individuals apply antidiscrimination law spontaneously in their daily lives or within a given organisation (informal effectiveness). It also considers the decision-making processes that victims of discrimination follow to decide whether to seek advice and bring a complaint (formal effectiveness).
As regards informal effectiveness, the use of the directives is influenced by the social values and the internal rules of relevant communities. Differences in the application of the RED and the FED between MS can thus partly be explained by the existence of favourable or unfavourable social conditions at national level. For instance, the fact that some national legal orders enshrine more strongly than others legal principles which can clash with anti-discrimination law, may reduce its use at an informal level.
As regards formal effectiveness, victims may be confronted with a number of obstacles which may dissuade them to seek for advice from filters and from bringing legal actions (social lumping). Victims may be influenced by their inferior position as regards the perpetrator, especially if they belong to socially excluded groups or the perpetrator is a superior. They can also fail to have the necessary economic and moral support to bear the psychological and economic cost of lengthy legal procedures. Even if the victim takes action, the screening role of filters and the legal system's selective procedures may still leave their cases out of the legal system (institutional lumping).
This analysis suggests that the evaluation of the effects of the RED and the FED needs to be based not only on formal procedures and litigation rates, but also on socio-legal analysis of the extent to which the directives are used at all social levels. The use of the directives at informal and organisational levels can be crucial to understand how they work in practice and why litigation rates are so low in some MS. The fact that litigation rates are low can be due to social and institutional lumping, 152 See text to n 88-92.
